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COMMENTS
THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE: ALTERNATIVE
CHALLENGES TO THE CORPORATE FORM

INTRODUCTION

A corporation is ordinarily considered by law to be an entity
separate from its shareholders.' As such, the corporation's share-3
holders have limited liability 2 for obligations of the corporation.
This rule of limited liability' 4is challenged when someone seeks to
"pierce the corporate veil and impose liability for corporate
debts or other obligations on the shareholders. 5 In order to im1. One of the first cases to enunciate this rule was Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) ("A corporation is an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."). See also
Sayers v. Texas Land & Mortgage Co., 78 Tex. 244, 247, 14 S.W. 578, 579 (1890)
("The creation of the corporation was authorized by law, and upon its formation it
became an artificial being, distinct from its corporators."). Courts are often preoccupied with whether a business concern is a "juristic entity" for various reasons. See,
e.g., Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945), where the court struggled
with the issue of whether a business should be treated as a single piece of property or
be divided up into inventory, cash receivables, fixtures, merchandise, etc., for capital
gains treatment. The majority held that it should be divided up into its fragments and
separately treated. The dissent opined that when a business is sold as a unit, the
whole is greater than its parts.
2. There is no doubt that as a general principle the members are not
liable for a corporation's debts . . . . The principle is sometimes
known as the rule of "limited liability," because it does not relieve corporate members of liability for the amounts they have promised to contribute as the dues of membership, or in consideration for shares.
A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 424 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
3. See id See also H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 251 (2d ed. 1970).
4. "The converse of the recognition of corporateness in some instances of defective incorporation is the disregard of corporateness in various cases of technicallycorrect incorporation. Such disregard, in terms of metaphor, is often called 'piercing
the corporate veil.'" H. HENN, supra note 3, at 250 (footnotes omitted). See also
Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955) ("Piercing the corporate veil" is necessary to prevent fraud.).
5. A corporation possesses the limited liability attribute of a separate entity only
because state business corporation acts so provide. See Hamilton, The CorporateEntity, 49 TEx. L. REV. 979, 981 (1971). See also, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 25 (1979): "A holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation shall be under no
obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect to such shares other than the
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pose personal liability on the corporation's shareholders in a particular case, the party raising the challenge must convince the
court to disregard the concept of the corporation as a separate entity. Usually, the challenge is directed at the limited liability rule.
A court's decision to ignore the perception of the corporation as a
referred to as an application of the
separate entity is commonly
6
alter ego doctrine.
obligation to pay to the corporation the full consideration for which such shares were
issued or to be issued."
6. This Comment will use the term "alter ego." Judges, however, use similar
metaphors when they decide whether to disregard the concept of the corporation as a
separate entity. For example, "mere adjunct," "agent," "alias," "alter idem," "arm,"
"blind," "branch," "buffer," "cloak," "coat," "corporate double," "cover," "creature,"
"curious reminiscence," "delusion," "department," "mouthpiece," "name," "nominal
identity," "phrase," "puppet," "screen," "sham," "simulacrum," "snare," "stooge,"
"subterfuge," or "tool" are words judges often use in what this Comment will refer to
as alter ego analysis. See E. LArrY & G. FRAMPTON, BASIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS,
CASES, TEXT & PROBLEMS 721 (1963). See also, e.g., American Petroleum Exch., Inc.
v. Lord, 399 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) ("The corporation did not exist
except as the shadow of his personality."), and Justice Cardozo's assessment in Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) ("The whole problem
• ..is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor."). In typical alter ego
cases, the aim is to punish shareholders for using the separate entity status in bad
faith. See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681 (4th Cir. 1976); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr.
641 (1961); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970); Zaist v.
Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414,
222 N.E.2d 721, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
In general, corporate authority is delegated, while partners have inherent authority to engage in partnership business. See E.LATTY & G. FRAMPTON, supra, at 4344, 68-70. In addition, corporate shareholders enjoy limited liability, while partners
are personally liable for partnership debts. See A. FREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 3-18 (1951), for an overview of the difference
between partnership and corporation liability rules. When a person believes he or she
is dealing with a partnership because of a representation of the entity, and he or she is
in fact dealing with a corporation, the corporation can be said to be using the corporate form in "bad faith."
For a discussion of the general principles of corporation law, see generally RESTATEMENT OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, 1928-1932); H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP (1979); COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE (D.

Schwartz ed. 1979).
In order to determine whether the separate corporate entity concept should be
disregarded, the court considers several factors. These factors include: 1) whether the
corporation is undercapitalized; 2) whether there was an attempt to adequately capitalize; 3) whether there was commingling of corporate and individual funds; 4)
whether the corporation was an "instrumentality" of the shareholders; 5) whether the
plaintiff was aware that the defendant and the corporation were not the same entities;
6) whether plaintiff relied upon plaintiffs belief that he/she was dealing with some
entity; 7) whether the corporation had by-laws; 8) whether the entities had the same
employees and whether the employees received salaries; 9) whether there was an intent or desire on the part of the individuals and the corporation to act separately; 10)
whether the entities employed the same attorney; 11) whether the corporation was
used as a conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another
corporation; 12) whether there was a disregard of formalities; 13) whether there was a
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Sometimes, however, the concept of the corporation as a separate entity is challenged for reasons other than to impose personal liability on shareholders. 7 Parties asserting these alternative
challenges seek to benefit from the way the law affects business
associations.8 Courts deciding these cases often employ the same
alter ego analysis used in cases where the limited liability rule is
challenged. 9 The traditional alter ego analysis is often inadequate
when applied in these cases and, as a result, rulings are often inconsistent. 10 Further, the courts have failed to articulate adequate
reasons for their decisions."
This Comment examines alternative challenges' 2 to the sepafailure to maintain arms-length relationships among related entities; 14) whether the
corporation was used as a subterfuge for illegal transactions; and 15) whether the
corporation kept minutes. Courts examine this list in typical alter ego cases where
creditors seek to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on the shareholders. No
single factor suffices to justify the challenge to the limited liability aspect of the separate entity concept. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,
540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 641 (1961); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Walkovszky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 222 N.E.2d 721, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966). See also infra
notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 70-116 and accompanying text. This Comment will use the
terms "alter ego" and "piercing the corporate veil" for instances when the corporate
form is disregarded for the purpose of challenging the limited liability rule. The
phrase "disregard the corporate entity" will be used when the corporate form is challenged for other purposes.
8. For example, some usury laws protect individual borrowers but not corporate
borrowers. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(1) (McKinney 1978): "No corporation shall hereafter interpose the defense of usury in any action." See also infra note
103. A challenge to the corporate entity would thus determine whether the statute
protects corporate borrowers. Hence, this type of challenge is quite different from the
more typical case where a successful challenge would impose shareholder liability.
9. See infra notes 70-116 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 70-116 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 70-116 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70-116 and accompanying text. Other unusual challenges to
the corporate form are:
a. Personaljurisdictionalpurposes.Courts have used alter ego analysis to determine whether a parent corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction because of the
activities of its subsidiary. Eg., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S.
333 (1925). Essentially, the Court in Cannon read the alter ego doctrine into state
long-arm statutes as a jurisdictional test. Id. at 337. Recent lower court decisions,
however, have indicated that the alter ego doctrine is not a jurisdictional test. For
example, in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D.
Kan. 1978), the court specifically stated that alter ego analysis was not the proper
method of determining whether the state had personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation. The court held that mere formal separation of corporate identities does not
raise a constitutional barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident whose
affiliated corporation has a substantial nexus with the forum. The intercorporate relationship between the parents and subsidiaries was found to be a sufficient contact with
the forum so that jurisdiction over the corporation would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
b. Dipersityunrsdition. In Lavin v. Lavin, 182 F.2d 870, 871 (2d Cir. 1950), the
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rate entity fiction.' 3 First, it will analyze the economic policies
underlying the separate entity concept' 4 and the justification for
imposing shareholder liability in typical alter ego cases.' 5 Second,
this Comment will review cases in which the corporate entity is
challenged for alternative purposes and demonstrate how the
usual alter ego analysis fails in these cases. 16 Finally, this Comment proposes a three-stage analysis for examining alternative
challenges to the separate entity fiction. 17 The proposal would require courts to analyze the facts of the cases, identify the policies
underlying the challenge, and balance the economic and non-economic policies that would be either furthered or frustrated by disregarding the separate corporate entity concept.' 8 This Comment
will then demonstrate the utility of this framework by showing
how the analysis would work in cases involving alternative
challenges. 19

I.

TYPICAL ALTER EGO CASE

One of the main reasons for incorporation is limiting the
owners' liability. 20 As a result, two categories of conflicting polijusticies emerge: those supporting the entity concept, 2' and those
22
fying the imposition of personal liability on shareholders.
court utilized alter ego factors in determining whether federal diversity jurisdiction
was present.
c. Determination of enemy characterduring war. In Daimler Co. v. Continental
Tyre & Rubber Co., 1916 A.C. 307 (H.L.), the court used alter ego analysis to determine whether a corporation was an enemy alien because its shareholders were enemy
aliens.
d. Res/udicata purposes. In McNamara v. Powell, 256 A.D. 554, 11 N.Y.S.2d
491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) (sole shareholder was party to prior litigation on a relevant
issue), and In re Shea, 309 N.Y. 605, 132 N.E.2d 864 (1956) (all shareholders in a
family corporation were parties to prior litigation), the courts used alter ego analysis
in deciding whether res judicata or collateral estoppel should apply. In neither of
these cases was the corporation itself a party to the instant action.
13. "Sometimes, to be sure, the corporation is called a 'fictional' entity-in apparent recognition of the abstract and potentially misleading nature of the concept.
Still, there is the basic notion of a barrier, a psychological wall, between the shareholders (and other participants in the venture) and the corporation." W. KLEIN,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 98 (1980).
14. See infra notes 23-52 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 70-117 and accompanying text.
17. See infra § III.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 123-145 and accompanying text.
20. R. DEER, J. ANDERSON, L. BLACK, M. SCOTT & R. SIMPSON, THE LAWYER'S
BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE MANUAL 7-19 (2d ed. 1978); C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 2.05-.08 (5th ed. 1975 &
Supp. 1982).
21. See infra notes 23-52 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.

19821
A.

48L TERNA TIV E CHALLENGES

PoliciesSupporting the Separate Entity Concept

Originally, corporations were grants from the English Crown
authorizing individuals to unite and form enterprises. 23 These
early corporations were municipalities that constructed roads and
irrigation systems for the common benefit.24 Later, corporations
developed into business entities. In the United States, legislatures

acknowledged the evolution of the corporate form by enacting

business codes authorizing corporate existence. 25 Today, corporations derive from these codes their authority to carry on activities

as separate entities.26 Limited liability
is an adjunct to regarding
27
the corporation as a separate entity.

The primary reason for treating the corporation as a separate
entity is to encourage the efficient operation of a free enterprise

system.28 Efficiency is achieved by reducing transaction costs,
streamlining business operations, and encouraging the aggrega-

tion of large amounts of capital. 29 The separate entity status furthers these goals by providing a convenient and efficient form for
transacting business. 30 The limited liability rule serves to diversify investor risks and to subsidize the corporate entities
by allo3

cating risks to tort creditors of insolvent corporations. '
1. Convenience and Efficiency

The states' business corporation acts 32 accord to corporations
23. Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation,5 J. ECON.
HIST. 1 (1945).

24. Id.
25. Chayes, Introduction to J. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS vii-xii (1961).
26. Cf. H. HEN, supra note 3, at 30 ("At the state level are the basic laws governing the formulation of business associations.").
27. Limited liability was not the general rule until the middle of the 19th century.
This attribute may have been given to corporations more because of legislative concern with lagging industrial production than with judicial concern with the separate
entity concept of the corporation. E.M. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
UNTIL 1860, at 380-84 (1954). Courts do not always consider the limited liability
attribute inviolate and have imposed liability on shareholders to punish those who
have used the separate entity privilege in bad faith. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business L to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32.
29. See Alchian & Demetz, Production,Information Costs, andEconomic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 777, 778-89 (1972). The authors engage in a general
discussion and economic analysis of the desirability of associating for business purposes. See also Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems. Law And Economics, 53 VA.
L. REV. 259, 260 (1967). Manne maintains that the development of the corporation
came into existence because of the economic need to raise capital.
30. See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
32. This Comment will use the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1979) as the example of a state statute which creates the corporate form. The Model Act was the basis
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separate entity attributes that makes a corporation a convenient
and cost efficient form by which to transact business. One such
attribute is separate, centralized management, which relieves investors of the duty of managing the business and lessens the transaction costs of the decision-making process. 33 Another facilitating
aspect of corporate codes allows corporations to sue or be sued as
entities, 34 thus avoiding the costs and difficulty of joining all a corporation's owners as plaintiffs or defendants. In the interests of
convenience and efficiency, state statutes also permit corporations

to hold and convey property, 35 contract as an entity, 36 and con37

tinue operating beyond the death or departure of the owners.
Corporations can borrow money and exercise all other necessary
38
or convenient powers to achieve their purposes as entities.

for the corporation statutes in Alabama (adopted in 1959), Alaska (adopted in 1957),
Arizona (adopted in 1975), Arkansas (adopted in 1965), California (adopted in 1977),
Colorado (adopted in 1958), Connecticut (modified and adopted in 1959), Georgia
(adopted in 1969), Iowa (adopted in 1959), Maryland (modified and adopted in 1951),
Massachusetts (modified and adopted in 1965), Mississippi (adopted in 1962), Nebraska (adopted in 1963), New Jersey (modified and adopted in 1968), New Mexico
(adopted in 1967), New York (modified and adopted in 1963), North Carolina (modified and adopted in 1955), North Dakota (adopted in 1957), Oregon (adopted in
1953), Rhode Island (adopted in 1969), South Carolina (modified and adopted in
1962), South Dakota (adopted in 1965), Tennessee (adopted in 1968), Texas (adopted
in 1955), Virginia (adopted in 1956), Washington (adopted in 1965), West Virginia
(adopted in 1953), and Wisconsin (adopted in 1951). See generally MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT (1978). The MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT has been adopted in substance
in more than 35 states. See Preface to MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1979).
33. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979). Centralized management reduces

transaction costs by obviating the need for each owner to meet and make every decision concerning the corporation. Instead, the shareholders/investors vote for the persons they believe will operate the corporation most effectively. Id. § 36. Of course,
investors must bear the risk of loss from such decisions as well as the profits.
34. Id. § 4(b).
35. Id. § 4(d), (e), (g).
A corporation's ability to hold and convey property avoids the difficulty of determining which owner should own and convey property, the inconvenience of having to
find all the owners to convey jointly-held property, and the complicated questions of
control and management that would arise if the property were held either jointly or
separately. Thus, the entity concept greatly decreases the transaction costs and difficulties associated with property owned for business purposes.
36. Id. § 4(f), (h).
Since business codes allow a corporation to contract as an entity, the risk and
cost of non-performance is distributed among the corporation's owners.
37. Id. § 4(a).
Since corporate business can continue functioning beyond the death or departure
of the owners, third parties can depend on the business entity's indefinite existence; a
corporation does not have to reorganize, restructure, and rebuild every time its ownership changes.
38. Id. § 4(f), (h).
Because corporations can borrow money as entities, a lender need only examine
the credit history of the corporation and not that of its owner. As a result, transaction
costs are greatly decreased. State business codes also authorize corporations to exercise all other necessary or convenient powers to achieve their purposes, giving them
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In addition, a corporation is taxed separately from its owners
and must file its own tax forms.39 A corporation may be a
"debtor" under the bankruptcy laws and thus may take advantage
of the relief afforded insolvent debtors notwithstanding the solvency of the corporation's owners.40 Court decisions according
"personal" rights and privileges to corporations exemplify the reification 4of corporations through use of the separate entity
concept. 1
These separate entity attributes make the corporate form a
convenient and cost efficient medium for transacting business.
The convenience aspect of corporate separateness, however, is not
challenged in typical alter ego cases. Instead, the plaintiffs in typical alter ego cases attack the limited liability rule, which diversifies risk and subsidizes the corporate entity.
2. Risk Diversification
The limited liability aspect of corporate status encourages investment by allowing investors to diversify their risk, thus reducing the cost of amassing capital for productive enterprise. 42 The
limited liability aspect of corporations allows43 individuals to invest
without fear of losing their personal assets.
broad power to act as entities. Id. § 4 (g), (j), (n), (p). See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG,
PARTNERSHIP 16-26 (1968), for a discussion of aspects of separate legal entity concept in the partnership area. See also Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform
PartnershipAct an Aggregate or an Entity, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377, 381-82 (1963), for
a discussion of the legal essentials of separate personality, and Note, PartnershfsConflict ofLaws-LegalEntity Concept, 27 TENN. L. REV. 304 (1960), for a discussion
of the consequences of the separate entity concept in choice of law problems involving
partnerships.
39. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-

TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1-14 to -22 (4th ed. 1979). Cf. Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189, 214 (1920) (corporation is distinct entity and taxed separately).
40. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(30), 109 (Supp. IV 1980).
41. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a corporation is a "person"
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). See also Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 208--09 (1946) (a corporation enjoys the right of the "people" to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures); Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1967) (a corporation may sue for defamation); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322-23 (7th
Cir.) (a corporation is a "client" and entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilegein the CorporateArena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901,passim (1969) (citing Radiant Burners and other cases
holding that a corporation may invoke the attorney-client privilege).
42. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest.: Efficiency, Fairnessand CorporateStructure,
25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 774 n.102 (1978).
43. If individuals can invest fractions of their savings in various enterprises without risking debilitating losses when any one enterprise becomes insolvent, the cost of
raising capital is reduced, and individual investment is stimulated.
Given a choice between investing in a risky enterprise with high returns and
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Risk diversification and the aggregation of large amounts of

44
capital are strong economic justifications for limited liability.

These economic attributes are essential to the stimulation and de-

velopment of industry in a free enterprise system. 45 Therefore, the
judiciary must have compelling reasons to ignore the limited
liability rule in order to impose liability on shareholders. 46
3. Subsidizing the Corporate Entity
In some instances, the limited liability aspect of separate en-

47
tity status acts as a subsidy to insolvent corporate tortfeasors.
When an insolvent corporation commits a tort, innocent third par-

ties-tort victims-must absorb the loss. Since the victims are un48
able to negotiate in advance to avoid the limited liability rule,
4
9
essentially they become involuntary creditors and must absorb
investing in a safe enterprise with lower returns, most individuals opt for the safer
investment unless the promised return compensates them for taking the risk. This
phenomenon is called risk aversion. In order to compensate individuals for taking
large liability risks, corporations would have to promise a higher return on investment, which would increase the cost of amassing capital. As long as individuals believe that not all their capital is subject to liability, they will accept lower returns
because thay can diversify their risk by spreading their capital investment over various enterprises. See P. O'Donnell, Taking the Plunge. Many New Investors Have
Modest Means But Large Ambitions, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 1,col. 5. O'Donnell
describes new investors as younger and less risk averse than their predecessors. He
concludes that because these investors were not in the market during 1973 and 1974,
and did not remember "lean years" in the market, they tend to be less risk averse than
their predecessors.
44. Limited liability is an aspect of corporateness because it was and still is a
basic assumption of businessmen. It is not an "essential" characteristic of corporateness, but an attribute "which, for reasons of social expediency, seems desirable to
attach to the modem corporation." The attributes of corporateness are determined by
the economic and social environment of the time: "[W]hat laws propose, the underlying forces of economics dispose." A. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS
14-16 (5th ed. 1953). Cf. Deiser, The JuristicPerson, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 131 (1908)
(implicitly regards the immunity of shareholders as merely an incident of the corporation's holding of property, but not a necessary incident). Both Dewing and Deiser
suggest that the two concepts are not logically, legally, or historically coextensive.
45. Cf W. KLEIN, supra note 13, at 75-79 (discussing the problems of raising
capital in the context of partnerships).
46. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
47. This is true for all tort creditors of insolvent corporations. In general, however, contractual creditors negotiate around the limited liability rule. See, e.g., Teller
v. Clear Serv. Co., 9 Misc. 2d 495, 498-99, 173 N.Y.S.2d 183, 186 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1958). In Teller, the effect of carrying on the business of owning and operating taxicabs through multiple corporations was to limit the liability on a suit by the injured
party.
48. Most entities and individuals contracting with financially weak corporations
do so by requiring personal guarantees or charging a higher rate of interest. Cf R.
POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 269 (1980).

49. Professors Posner and Scott maintain that the limited liability aspect of incorporation does not externalize the risk of loss. Rather, the risk is paid for by the corpo-
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their losses when the corporation is insolvent. 50

Convenience, risk diversification, and business subsidization
are important reasons for maintaining the separate entity concept
and for declining to impose corporate liability on shareholders.
Courts should accord these policies different weights, however, de-

pending on their importance. 5' In any event, in order for shareholders to enjoy the privilege of limited
liability courts generally
52

require that they act in good faith.

B. Justificationfor Imposing ShareholderLiabili&t
In every case in which courts impose shareholder liability, the

shareholders arguably have acted in bad faith.53 Many of the
metaphors used to justify imposing shareholder liability imply
ration because third parties either negotiate for more favorable terms to pay for the
risk, or require guarantees or other provisions to reduce the risk. They conclude,
however, that unlimited liability would discourage risk averse investors and that most
individuals are risk averse. Id. at 269.
50. Id. at 268--70.
While this may encourage some entrepreneurs to form small business ventures, it
may also promote undercapitalization. In Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841,
87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617 (1970), the court defended the grossly undercapitalized
corporation:
There is no question that the corporation was underfinanced, a condition not uncommon among new small businesses, including small corporations privately financed. It is common knowledge that many such
corporations have been highly successful, that others have prospered
but without legendary success, and that still others have failed in part,
at least, because of inadequate capital. Such is the story of our American enterprise system.
"Thin" corporations can take advantage of the limited liability rule, using it in lieu of
insurance as a shield from personal liability. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18
N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (ownership of taxi fleet vested in
many corporations, with each owning one or two cabs, thus allowing the corporations
to operate with minimum capitalization and without insurance).
Although subsidization of small business ventures serves the valid economic policy of encouraging growth, it also frustrates the important tort policy of making
tortfeasors pay for those losses that they caused. R. POSNER & K. ScoTT, Supra note
48, at 271. Because this economic consequence of the limited liability rule involves a
fairly narrow category of cases and thwarts a strong tort policy, subsidization is not
nearly as strong a reason as is the diversification of risk policy for retaining the separate entity status.
51. For instance, tort subsidization should not be weighed as heavily as either
convenience or diversification because the latter two serve important economic goals
and neither one has a countervailing undesirable effect.
52. See all cases cited in § I.
53. Id. For example, when an attorney cheated his client by forming a sham
corporation, the court asserted that his bad faith behavior justified piercing the corporate veil. Clark v. Millsap, 197 Cal. 765, 242 P. 918 (1926) (corporation was at all
times the attorney's alter ego and was employed by him to perfect the scheme by
which he cheated his client).
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bad faith.5 4 The list of factors courts generally examine in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil includes criteria that directly indicate bad faith behavior.5 5 Other factors imply bad faith
more subtly. For instance, in traditional alter ego analysis, courts
implicitly find bad faith when the officers or shareholders of a
grossly undercapitalized 56 corporation deceive third parties into
believing that they are contracting with individuals rather than
with a corporation.5 7 Requiring shareholders to act in good faith
is justifiable because the policies served by the limited liability
59
rule58 rest on an assumption of good faith behavior.
54. For example, "cloak," "creature," "sham," "shell," and "snare," etc. In discussing these metaphors, Professor Hamilton noted that:
[t]his language is inherently unsatisfactory since it merely states the
conclusion and gives no guide to the considerations that lead a court to
decide that a particular case should be considered an exception to the
general principle of nonliability. A systematic analysis, moreover, is
not readily discernible in the cases, and many courts continue to rely on
metaphors to explain their results.
Hamilton, The CorporateEntity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 979 (1971). See also supra note
6.
55. For example, either an intent to perpetrate a fraud, see, e.g., Design Assocs.,
Inc. v. Welch, 224 Cal. App. 2d 165, 36 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1964), or a corporation used
"as a subterfuge of illegal transactions," see, e.g., Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d
386, 395, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (1972), constitute bad faith behavior.
56. A number of alter ego cases emphasize undercapitalization as the factor causing the corporate veil to be pierced. The amount of capitalization appears parenthetically in the following examples. Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15
Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961) (amount of capitalization was triffing when compared to business to be done); Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306
P.2d 1 (1957) (none proved); Linco Servs., Inc. v. DuPont, 239 Cal. App. 2d 841, 49
Cal. Rptr. 196 (1966) (none); Platt v. Billingsley, 234 Cal. App. 2d 577, 44 Cal. Rptr.
476 (1965) (none); Rosen v. Losch, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1965) ($856); Remme v. Herzog, 222 Cal. App. 2d 863, 35 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963)
($7,700).
57. Cf. Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 843, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1970)
(court refused to pierce the corporate veil despite undercapitalization because plaintiff
was not deceived into believing that he was dealing with individuals rather than with
a corporation); Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 490, 197 P.2d 167, 172
(1948) (court refused to pierce the corporate veil where it was clear to plaintiff that he
was dealing with the officer of a corporation and not with an individual). If such
implicit bad faith does not exist, undercapitalization by itself is not enough to justify
piercing the corporate veil. As other factors in the traditional shopping list-such as
whether the corporation had by-laws, or kept minutes- do not imply bad faith,
courts have not imposed shareholder liability when only such innocuous factors existed. See, e.g., Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825,
26 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1962) (bad faith is always an underlying consideration where the
trial court was justified in disregarding the corporate entity); Luis v. Orcutt Town
Water Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 433, 22 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1948) (showing of bad faith is
prerequisite for piercing corporate veil).
58. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 42-50'and accompanying text.

19821

ALTERNATIVE CHALLENGES

C. Overview
The alter ego doctrine has not developed into a cogent body
of law. 60 The tension between stare decisis 6 1 and the judiciary's

desire to do justice in every case 62 has turned a fact-oriented examination of "bad faith" 63 into a mechanical application of factors that have only limited usefulness as precedent. 64 The
traditional alter ego analysis, while often plagued with problems
of mechanical and uneven application, 65 is useful when the question before the court is whether to afford to the shareholders the
benefits of limited liability. 66 The crucial difference between typical alter ego cases and the types of alternative challenges which
this Comment examines is that the alternative challenges are di60. Grossman, Alter Ego." 4 Perplexing Doctrine, 51 L.A.B.J. 233 (1975). See
Montgomery, The Alter Ego Type Defenses Reconsidered, 13 FORUM 528 (1978), for a
criticism of the use of the standard analysis and the phrase "alter ego" in fidelity bond
cases. Montgomery maintains that it is actually the sole actor doctrine or sole representative theory which is advanced. The fidelity insurer seeks to impute knowledge of
fraud or dishonesty to the corporate insured in order to support one or more special
defenses.
61. Strictly speaking, stare decisis is not a rule of law, but a matter of judicial
policy. Geohegan v. Union Elevated R. Co., 266 II. 482, 496-97, 107 N.E. 786,
792-93 (1915); Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 282-83, 70
N.W.2d 86, 88-89 (1955), overruled on other grounds, Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb.
183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966). It simply involves a court's reliance on a prior court's
decision to guide it in rendering a decision in the case before it. Higher court decisions are binding on lower courts, and courts at the same level of the judicial branch
should decide cases consistently.
62. The alter ego doctrine has been shaped by two basic policies of the law:
"stare decisis" and "justice in each case." Because these policies are inconsistent, they
push and pull at each other, forming the list of factors presently comprising the law of
"piercing the corporate veil." The overriding goal of courts applying the alter ego
doctrine is to secure a just and equitable result. This consideration is especially important in alter ego cases because of the equitable nature of the doctrine as well as the
vague nature in which courts have identified the policies underlying it.
63. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F.
Supp. 610, 617-18 (D. Me. 1977) (some degree of moral culpability on the part of the
parent corporation must be shown, even if a subsidiary is found to be an alter ego or
instrumentality of the parent), af'd, 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978).
64. See supra note 6.
65. Summarizing the existing case law, Professor Latty states: "What the
formula comes down to, once shorn of verbiage about control, instrumentality,
agency, and corporate entity, is that liability is imposed to reach an equitable result."
E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 191 (1936). See also
Claremont Press Publishing Co. v. Barksdale, 187 Cal. App. 2d 813, 817, 10 Cal. Rptr.
214, 217 (1960) (all that is required to disregard the corporate entity is that it would be
unjust to recognize it as a corporate entity).
66. For a discussion of piercing the corporate veil in order to defeat the shareholders' limited liability, see Gillespie, The Thin CorporateLine.- Less of Limited Liability Protection, 45 N.D.L. REV. 363 (1969). For a proposal of a standard that would
pierce the corporate veil where inadequate captitalization is the sole factor to consider, see Comment, Limited Limited Liability: A Definitive JudicialStandardforthe
Inadequate CapitalizationProblem, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 321 (1974).
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rected solely at the fiction of separateness. The key issue asks
whether a court should recognize the entity fiction when the parties challenging it actually prefer that the court disregard the entity so that they may accomplish other objectives. 67 In these cases,
the factor analysis 68 fails because courts consider neither the policies underlying the separate entity concept nor the other policies
underlying the alternative challenge. When the corporate form is
challenged for purposes other than imposing liability on shareholders, the policies underlying the challenge are not exactly the
same as those underlying the alternative challenge to the limited
liability rule. In alternative challenge cases, courts should examine other justifications for disregarding the separate entity
concept.

II.

ALTERNATIVE CHALLENGES To THE SEPARATE ENTITY
FICTION

Parties challenge the fiction that a corporation is separate and
distinct from its shareholders in various situations. The cases can
be divided into two broad categories: the challenge of one party

to the separate entity status of another, and the shareholders'
and/or corporation's challenge to its own corporate separateness.
A.

One Party,Challengesthe Separate Entity Status ,f Another

In typical alter ego cases where the limited liability rule is
challenged, the party raising the challenge attempts to show that
the corporation should not be viewed as a separate entity. In contrast, certain alternative challenge cases utilize the same procedural posture but challenge a different aspect of the separate
entity theory.
1. Setoff Cases
In order for a defendant to obtain a setoff69 against a plaintiff's claim, the debt must be mutual and must exist between both
parties. 70 Since a corporation is viewed as separate from its owners, the general rule is that obligations of shareholders or subsidiaries to a defendant may not be set off against the corporation's
67. See infra notes 70-117 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 6.

69. Setoff "is defined as a remedy employed by a defendant to discharge or reduce plaintiff's demand by an opposite one arising from a transaction which is extrinsic to the plaintiff's cause of action." Edmonds v. Stratton, 457 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Mo.
,Ct. App. 1970). In some cases it may be replaced by the counterclaim. See, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 13. "Of course, setoff is not permitted when it would impair stated capital
or prejudice the rights of corporate creditors." H. HENN, supra note 3, at 267.
70. Cf. H. HENN, supra note 3, at 267.
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claim against the defendant, and vice versa. 7 1 In practice, this
normally means that if a shareholder in his individual capacity
sues a party who has a claim against the shareholder's corporation
arising out of a collateral matter, the corporation's debt can not be
set off against the shareholder's claim. 72 This result is sound when
large, publicly owned corporations are involved because of the
complexity of their financial structure. 73 The result also is consistent with the basic policies supporting diversification of investors'
risk.74 In cases where the corporation is solely owned 75 or where
there are affiliated parent and subsidiary corporations, 76 the rule
against setoff frustrates the policies of efficiency and convenience77 that underly the separate entity fiction.
a. One-person corporations. Courts usually refuse to allow
78
setoffs in controversies involving solely owned corporations.
Two lawsuits often result when the dispute could have been settled in one. In cases where the owner and the corporation cannot
be joined as defendants, 79 the fiction of the separate entity serves
little purpose and disregarding the fiction avoids an unnecessary
second lawsuit.8 0 By raising a procedural obstacle to what could
71. See McLendon v. Galloway, 216 Ga. 261, 116 S.E.2d 208 (1960). ALendon
involved a cross-complaint filed by the buyers of a corporation against the seller to
have the seller's indebtedness to the corporation and damages resulting from the
seller's alleged fraud in misrepresenting the corporate debt set off against the buyer's
indebtedness to the seller for the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The Georgia
Supreme Court held that the buyers were not entitled to setoff because the corporation was separate from the owners of the corporation's stock.
72. Edmonds v. Stratton, 457 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
73. Schneider & Manko, Going Public-Practice,Procedure, and Consequences,
15 VILL. L. REV. 283, 289-90 (1970). Among many of the complexities of public
corporation financing, the authors discuss the problems of determining the number of
shares to be offered and their prospective price. The authors conclude that this is a
matter of'judgment. Factors to consider in determining the amount of public investment that can profitably be employed in the business are "the company's need for
funds and the dilution in earnings per share to result from the additional issuance of
stock." Id. at 290.
74. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 82--88 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 54 N.W. 1115
(1893).
79. If the claims against the owner and the corporation do not arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence the two often cannot be joined. See FED. R. Civ. P.
20(a).
80. See State Trust & Say. Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co., 30 N.M. 566,
240 P. 469 (1925) (explained in Barber's Super Mkts. v. Stryker, 84 N.M. 181, 187, 500
P.2d 1304, 1310 (1972), as resting on agency principles). Indeed, in State Trust, had
the court recognized the separate entity fiction, the defendant would have had to file a
separate lawsuit to recover against the plaintiff for misrepresentation. There, Wigmore contracted with Hopewell, the president of Hermosa corporation, to buy a
ranch, which was the corporation's sole asset. Instead of taking title to the ranch
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be a neat settlement of all of the disputes between the parties in
one lawsuit, the court frustrates the convenience policy underlying

the separate entity concept. In sum, when a court decides oneshareholder corporation setoff disputes 8 ' by rigid adherence to the
fiction of the separate

entity, the

corporate

form is an

inconvenience.
b. Parent and subsidiary corporations. For a variety of reasons, owners of a business often choose to conduct the enterprise
82
in two or more corporate entities rather than as a single entity.

In cases where there are affiliated parent and subsidiary corporations, courts should allow a defendant to set off debts of a subsidiary corporation against the -claim of the plaintiff parent
corporation, and vice versa.8 3 When the parent and the subsidi-

ary, although in form two or more separate entities, are actually
one business, and one is obligated to indemnify the other for any
loss, multiple lawsuits can be avoided by disregarding the separate
entity concept and allowing setoff.8 4 The judges deciding these
personally, Wigmore arranged to buy all of the stock in the corporation and then pay
for the stock with notes of the corporation. Wigmore took corporate stock to limit his
personal liability to Hopewell, and Hopewell made false representations about the
ranch to induce Wigmore to buy it. After Wigmore refused further payment on the
notes because of the misrepresentation, Hopewell sued the corporation on the notes
and won at trial. After an exhaustive discussion of alter ego cases, the court held that
if enforcing the fiction of the separate entity in the particular case would have inequitable results, the corporate veil should be pierced. Id. at 572-77. The court disregarded the corporate fiction to reveal the real nature of the transaction: Wigmore had
purchased the ranch as an individual and was being sued for the balance of the
purchase price. The court allowed Wigmore to set off the damages he suffered because of Hopewell's misrepresentation.
81. For a discussion of other issues arising in the context of sole-shareholder corporations, see Fuller, The IncorporateIndividual-A Study of the One-man Company,
51 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1376-1406 (1938).
82. Professor Landers has suggested several reasons for conducting business with
two corporate forms rather than one: "to separate functions for administrative ease,
to control many businesses with a minimal capital investment, to comply with various
legal requirements, to minimize liability, or to insulate certain assets from liability for
other activities, and [to avoid taxes]." Landers, A UnifiedApproachto Parent,Subsidiary andAffiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 589 (1975).
83. See id Landers suggests that the historical background indicates that limited
liability was never intended to protect a parent corporation against liability for the
debts of its subsidiary. Id. at 618. But see R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, supra note 48, at
271-84.
84. For detailed explorations of the problem, see 1. M. WORMSER, DISREGARD
OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS (1927); Douglas &
Shanks, Insulationfrom Liability through Subsidiary Corporations,39 YALE L.J. 193
(1929); Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF.
L. REV. 12 (1925).
Compare Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
988 (1968), and Contractors Heating & Supply Co. v. Scherb, 163 Colo. 584, 432 P.2d
237 (1967), and Associates Dev. Corp. v. Air Control Prods., 392 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965) (all recognizing "corporateness"), with Segan Constr. Corp. v. NorWest Builders, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 691 (D. Conn. 1967), and Schoenberg v. Romike
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parent/subsidiary cases often look to irrelevant factors85 and do

not consider whether the policies supporting the concept of the
corporation as a separate entity are served in such situations.8 6 By
treating the businesses as one entity and consolidating two lawsuits into one, business risk still would be diversified with respect
to investors,8 7 and loss still would fall on the same shareholders,
but the transaction costs would be reduced.88
2.

Conduits Through Which Other Defenses May Be

Interposed
Some courts have disregarded the corporate entity to enable
parties to raise otherwise untenable defenses. 8 9 For example, in
Kahili, Inc. v. Yamamoto,90 the plaintiff corporation lost its suit to
Properties, 251 Cal. App. 2d 154, 59 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1967), and Platt v. Billingsley, 234
Cal. App. 2d 577, 44 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1965) (all disregarding "corporateness").
85. See generally Douglas & Shanks, supra note 84, and cases cited therein for
examples of the often irrelevant factors examined by courts in parent/subsidiary alter
ego cases. At one point the authors state:
The statement that the insulation will be broken down when the
subsidiary is an "agency," "adjunct," "instrumentality," "alter ego,"
"tool," "corporate double," or "dummy" of the parent is not helpful.
These concepts themselves need defining. At best they merely state results. And the results are significant only in light of the facts. The conclusion that the parent will be held liable only when the use of the
subsidiary is a "cloak for fraud" or is "inequitable," "unjust," or "unconscionable" also falls short of describing the standard of conduct
which the facts of most of the cases permit.
Id. at 195.
86. See, e.g., Ambridge Borough v. Philadelphia Co., 283 Pa. 5, 12, 129 A. 67, 69
(1925) (court found no "fraud or bad faith [or] unfair dealing" that would justify
ignoring separate corporate identities and affirmed the lower court without discussing
whether treating the parent and its subsidiaries as one corporation to secure the repair
of streets would harm policies favoring the treatment of parent and subsidiary corporations as separate entities). For a discussion of the policies supporting the separate
entity fiction, see supra notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
87. The business risk is diversified with respect to investors because there is only
one "real" investor-the parent corporation. See W. KLEIN, supra note 13, at 15358, for a discussion of the phenomenon of risk diversification.
88. The transaction costs are lower because defending one lawsuit is generally
less costly than defending two, especially in light of attorney fees and the demands
made by litigation on the defendant's time.
89. Eg, Wohlhuter v. St. Charles Lumber & Fuel Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 812, 323
N.E.2d 134 (1975). In this case the two shareholders attempted to raise accommodation party defenses under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-606 (1963) (Illinois Uniform
Commercial Code provision regarding impairment of recourse or collateral). The
court held that since the shareholders were the only owners of the corporation, the
loan was important to the interest of the corporation, and the note was signed in a
personal and corporate capacity, the shareholders were principals on the note and
could not raise the statutory defenses. The shareholders unsuccessfully attempted to
use an alter ego type argument to assert that they were separate and distinct from the
corporation and hence were accommodation parties.
90. 54 Hawaii 267, 506 P.2d 9 (1973). See also, e.g., Honolulu Lumber Co. v.
American Factors, Ltd., 265 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Hawaii 1965); Bartle v. Home

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:129

enforce a contract because of the unreasonable conduct of its principal shareholders. The shareholders of Kahili, Lee and Lyum,
had obtained an option on a sublease from Yamamoto and assigned the option to their corporation. A provision of the option
contract provided that the seller, Yamamoto, was to obtain the
consent of the tenants before the interest could be sold. If the tenants did not consent, Yamamoto was to refund the option price.
When asked to consent, the tenants' assignee, Bishop Trust Company, expressed concern that Kahili would not be able to fulfill its
responsibilities as landlord since it was thinly capitalized. Bishop
Trust Company asked Lee and Lyum to guarantee Kahili's performance as landlord, but the shareholders refused. The Trust
Company then refused to approve the sale of the sublease to
Kahili. Based on Yamamoto's failure to get Bishop Trust Company's approval, Kahili sued for a refund of the option price. The
court denied recovery, holding that the plaintiff's acts had made
the defendant's performance impossible. The court recognized
that it was not Kahili but rather Kahili's shareholders who had
made the performance impossible, yet the court treated Lee and
Lyum as "alter egos" of Kahili.9 1 Thus, the alter ego doctrine enabled the seller to argue that when a party to a contract prevents
the performance of a condition, the other party has a valid excuse
for non-performance.
The court's analysis of the challenge to the corporate entity,
however, was not adequate. The court merely stated that "[o]ther
courts have. . . under certain circumstances, disregarded the corporate entity."' 92 Following this unilluminating explanation of
precedent, the court cited a string of typical alter ego cases from
other jurisdictions. 93 In its cursory exploration of the facts in
Kahili, the court emphasized the shareholders' relationship to the
corporation, noting that they continued to transact business in
their individual capacities even after the assignment, but the court
failed to explain the significance of the relationship beyond stating
that Lee and Lyum had used Kahili as an "instrumentality. ' 94 In
addition, the court noted that Kahili was capitalized with only
$2,000 and found that Kahili's undercapitalization, in combination with Lee and Lyum's use of the corporation for their individual business affairs, justified Bishop Trust Company's refusal to
Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955) (containing broad
statements that under certain circumstances a court properly may disregard the corporate entity).
91. 54 Hawaii at 270, 506 P.2d at 11.
92. Id. at 271, 506 P.2d at 11.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 271, 506 P.2d at 12.
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approve the sale of the sublease. 95 The court concluded, without

clarifying its reasoning, that recognizing the
corporate fiction
96

would bring about "injustice and inequity.
This case exemplifies the courts' failure to recognize that the

limited liability rule is not under challenge in these alter ego cases.
Rather, the challenge is to the concept that the corporation is separate and distinct from its owners. The court in Kahili failed to
consider whether the strong policies supporting the separateness
of corporations would be compromised by its decision, and

whether any other policy might justify disregarding the separate
entity.
While setoffs and conduits for raising defenses procedurally
resemble typical alter ego cases, neither of these situations compromises the economic policies of risk diversification or the subsidization of the corporate entity. In other situations where the
separate entity concept is in dispute, both the challenge to the concept and the procedural context are unusual.
B. Shareholdersof CorporationsChallenge Their Own
Separateness
Generally, judges seem to feel that people who choose to in-

corporate must live with that choice. 97 In some situations, however, courts disregard the corporate entity.

1. Expectations of the Parties Cases
In some cases, parties at the time of contracting may have
expectations that would be frustrated if the corporate form was
later to be recognized. For example, in FontainbleauHotel Corp.
v. Crossman,98 the issue was who was entitled to renew the lease

for a store: a dissolved corporation, or its shareholder in possession of the premises. Mrs. Crossman, the shareholder, had exercised her option to renew the lease for a store in the name of her

family corporation, Florence Lustig of New York, Inc. She took
95. Id. at 270-71, 506 P.2d at 11-12.
96. Id. at 271, 506 P.2d at 12.
97. See, e.g., Hair Indus. v. United States, 340 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 950 (1965) (defendant had incorporated himself, and IRS subpoenaed records of
the corporation; defendant then attempted unsuccessfully to invoke his personal fifth
amendment privilege). See also Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S.
432 (1946) (corporate entities will not be disregarded when those in control have
adopted the corporate form to secure its advantages); Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802
(1977) (defendants argued that they were alter ego of Marina View and entitled to the
direct protection of CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976), but the court was
unpersuaded); Jonas v. Wisconsin, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N.W.2d 235 (1963) (corporation is treated as separate from its stockholders under all normal circumstances).
98. 286 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1961).

UCLA L,4W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:129

possession of the premises, operated a dress shop, paid the rent,
and otherwise followed the terms of the lease. The owner sued to
evict Mrs. Crossman after the family corporation dissolved. The
testimony and evidence indicated that the parties expected that
the premises would be rented to the tenant occupying them. The
owner argued, however, that Mrs. Crossman did not have an option to renew, that the defunct corporation had the option, and
that Mrs. Crossman, as an individual, could not exercise it. The
appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that Mrs.
Crossman and Florence Lustig of New York, Inc., "were inseparable and interchangeable." 99 Had the court recognized the separate entity, the expectations of the parties at the time of
contracting would have been frustrated. The court's holding was
sound because it furthered a legitimate objective of contract
law.' °° The court's reasoning became muddled, however, in a
later opinion in the same case, but on a different issue, when the
court made a cursory reference to the alter ego doctrine'01 and
failed to articulate the contract policy underlying the
transaction. 10 2
2. Usury Statute Cases
In many states, usury laws protect individual borrowers but
not corporate borrowers. 03 Lenders frequently try to circumvent
the protection that these laws afford to individual borrowers by
requiring them to incorporate.'0 4 If a lender sues the corporation
on a debt in these jurisdictions, the shareholder debtors often argue that the court should "pierce the corporate veil" and view the
shareholder as the real debtor. 0 5 Several courts have accepted
99. Id. at 929-30.
100. Fulfilling the expectations of the parties has for some time been considered a
legitimate objective of contract law. In a classic article, Professors Fuller and Perdue
analyze the various interests protected by contract law. See Fuller & Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1, 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
101. Fontainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Crossman, 323 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1963).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2306 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 687.03,
687.071 (West Supp. 1982); MD.COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-103(e) (1975); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 21.200(275) (Callaghan 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.060 (Vernon
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. 31:1-6 (West 1963); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.68 (Baldwin 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41,
§ 2 (Purdon 1971); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 34-31-80 (Law. Co-op. 1977); VA. CODE § 6.1330.43 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-10 (1980). See also supra note 8.
104. Lenders then extend credit to corporate entities at usurious rates of interest.
See Note, Incorporationto Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1390 n.6
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Incorporation]. The author maintains that it may be
commercially reasonable to force a buyer to incorporate in order to earn a higher
interest rate. See also, e.g., Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930)
(lender told borrower he would deal only with a corporation).
105. See infra notes 106-107.
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this argument; 10 6 others have not. 0 7
The courts that disregarded the fiction of corporate separateness found bad faith in the lender's intent to defeat public policies.' 08 Those that recognized the separate corporate entity
generally did not find any "inequity" because the individuals were
aware of the consequences of incorporation. 10 9 Both lines of
cases, however, applied the typical alter ego analysis. I 10 These

cases illustrate how the typical alter ego analysis often may lead to
opposite results. This inconsistency results from courts' failure to
articulate and balance two conflicting sets of policies: those sup-

porting the separate entity concept, and those embodied in the legislative prohibition of usurious loans to individuals.
3.

Tax Advantages

In tax cases, shareholders do not challenge the limited liability rule; instead, they assail the separate entity fiction in an effort
to gain an otherwise unavailable tax benefit.I' A successful challenge may mean that the shareholder will be taxed once at an in-

dividual rate rather than twice (once as a corporation and again
upon receipt of dividends)."12 A successful challenge may also
can treat corporate expenses as their
mean that the shareholders
own and deduct them."13

106. Eg., Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., 111 So. 2d 682 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1959), cert.
dischargedwithout opinion, 119 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1960); Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc.,
10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952); Lesser v. Strubbe, 56 N.J. Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 1959), rev'don other grounds, 67 N.J. Super. 537, 171 A.2d 114
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). In each of these cases, the court found, through an
alter ego theory, that the loan was in fact made to the individual because the corporation was formed solely to avoid the local usury statute.
107. E.g., Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930); Werger v. Haines
Corp., 277 A.D. 1168, 101 N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950), aft'd, 302 N.Y. 930,
100 N.E.2d 189 (1951); Metz v. Taglieri, 29 Misc. 2d 841, 215 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1961); Rosen v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Misc. 2d 329, 213 N.Y.S.2d
765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961), a~fd without opinion, 15 A.D.2d 810, 225 N.Y.S.2d 495
(N.Y. App. Div.), motionfor leave to appealdenied, 11 N.Y.2d 645 (1962); Mittman v.
Kuo, 5 Misc. 2d 595, 160 N.Y.S.2d 743 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957); Kings Mercantile Co. v.
Cooper, 199 Misc. 381, 100 N.Y.S.2d 754 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). The rationale followed in these cases was that there was no "inequity" because the individuals were
aware of the consequences of incorporation. See generally Note, Incorporation,supra
note 104.
108. See supra note 106.
109. See supra note 107.
110. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 106-107.
111. See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
112. I.R.C. §§ 116, 316 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE,
1.03, at 1-8
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
to -9 (4th ed. 1979).
113. Cf. Dodd v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1962) (court refused to
allow taxpayer to pierce his own corporation and deduct corporate expenses as his
own; however, court implied that this rule applies only where taxpayer, rather than an
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A court may disregard the corporate entity for income tax
purposes if the shareholders can show that the corporation is their
"alter ego" or "instrumentality" and that it has no substantial
business purpose and no function as an independent business organization.ll 4 When a court uses the usual alter ego metaphors in
tax cases, the issues become confused and the results are, unpredictable."15 This results from use of metaphors without examining
which policies would be either furthered or frustrated by disregarding the corporate entity.
III. A MODE OF ANALYSIS
This Comment has described some of the the problems resulting from a mechanical application of the traditional alter ego
criteria in cases of alternative challenges to the corporate entity.
Perhaps because courts fail to recognize the difference between
traditional and alternative challenges, they often examine many
factors that are irrelevant to a particular case. Courts also inadequately consider the policies underlying the concept of the corporation and the specific policies at issue in the case before them.
A. Analysis

Another mode of analysis is needed when courts consider
whether to disregard the corporate entity for purposes other than
imposing liability on shareholders. This Comment suggests a
three-step balancing approach which, if employed, would require
courts to consider economic policies as well as other important
social policies lurking beneath the challenge to the corporate
injured third party, seeks to pierce); Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d
395 (2d Cir. 1960) (same), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961). See generally 7 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 38.01-.15 (rev. ed. 1976).

114. Cf. Dodd, 298 F.2d at 577 ("It is well established that ifa taxpayer has voluntarily created a corporation to suit his or its own purposes, such taxpayer may not
ignore and disregard the corporate entity when to do so would result in an otherwise
unavailable tax benefit."). Compare Maine Aviation Corp. v. Johnson, 160 Me. 1,56, 199 A.2d 748, 750 (1964), and Bornar.Vawter, Inc. v. Johnson, 157 Me. 380, 387,
173 A.2d 141, 145 (1961) (attempts by corporations to disregard corporate form so
that transactions between parent and subsidiary might escape Maine's use tax. The
courts held that the veil sould not be pierced when to do so would give an unfair
advantage or contravene public policy).
115. See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, ISO F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945) (real property
held by a partnership was transferred to two corporations to hinder one of the party's
creditors; the partners acted as if the property was still partnership property. The
commissioner successfully taxed the corporation despite its contention that the corporate entity should be disregarded and the income treated as the partners' income.)
Compare Pamer with Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943),
discussed infra note 117. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 112, 1.5, at 1-14
to -27, for a criticism of the uneven use of the separate entity concept and the confused use of metaphors.
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1. A Factual Analysis
First, courts should determine why a party is seeking to disregard the corporate entity and which aspect of the entity is being
challenged. This preliminary step would enable courts to find fact
patterns with similar policies at issue.
2.

A Policy Analysis

Next, courts should identify which policy concerns the case
raises and determine whether those policies would be furthered or
frustrated by disregarding the corporate entity. Specific policies
would be more easily identified because of the prior factual analysis. Further, courts would more easily distinguish cases challenging the limited liability rule from those challenging other aspects
of corporate separateness. Included in this policy analysis would
be a consideration of whether the corporation and/or its shareholders acted in bad faith.
3. Balancing
Courts should weigh each policy according to its importance. 1 7 While some economic policies are compelling, others are
not at issue in cases where the limited liability rule is not challenged.1 8 Courts should consider and give great weight to legislative pronouncements on given issues.1 9 The parties' expectations
also should be given great weight, except when those expectations
116. Courts identify and balance the "public interest" in many contexts. In weighing public policies with respect to the granting of a stay motion, the District of Columbia Circuit has stated:
The public interest may, of course, have many faces-favoring at once
both the rapid expansion of utilities and the prevention of wasteful and
repetitive proceedings at the taxpayers' or consumers' expense; both
fostering competition and preserving the economic viability of existing
public services; both expediting administrative or judicial action and
preserving orderly procedure. We must determine, these many facets
considered, how the court's action serves the public best.
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
117. For example, in the leading case of Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,
319 U.S. 436 (1943), the Supreme Court stated without discussion: "At [the] time [the
tax was assessed, the corporation] was clearly not Thompson's alter ego and his exercise of control over [the corporation] was negligible." Id at 440. Apart from that
cursory statement, the Court failed to consider any tax policies at issue when determining if gains from the corporation's sales were income to the individual or to the
corporation. Id See also, e.g., Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960)
(the sole shareholder was taxed on his corporation's income on an "agency" theory,
but the court did not discusse any tax policies), cer. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961).
118. See supra § II.
119. See infra notes 134-140 and accompanying text.
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do not comport with the policy underlying the law. 120 Contract
and tort policies are extremely important,
yet they can be overrid12 1
den if a party acts in bad faith.

This three-step balancing approach will give some guidance
to otherwise undirected courts. The analysis can be used in all
cases of alternative challenges to the separate entity and can help
courts develop new policies,
disregard out-dated metaphors, and
make informed decisions.' 22
B. Applying the proposed mode of analysis

Under the mode of analysis proposed above, each case must
be examined in order to understand the facts and determine the
policies involved. This Comment will demonstrate how the proposed analysis would work in those alternative challenge cases
discussed above.
1. Setoff Cases
The factual analysis is similar in cases involving one-person
corporations 23 and those involving affiliated parent and subsidiary corporations. 24 In both types of cases, the parties ask the
court to disregard corporate separateness in order to reduce their
prospective liability. Defendants have a valid claim against the
sole shareholder, or the parent or subsidiary, of the plaintiff entity,
but recognition of the fiction that the corporation is separate and
distinct from its shareholders prevents them from setting off that
obligation. In these cases, the obstacle to the setoff is procedural
rather than substantive.
In situations involving one-person corporations where there
is no true financial separateness,1 25 and in situations involving
120. For example, courts do not enforce: 1) contracts barred by the statute of
limitations, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8 comment b (1981); 2) contracts barred by the statute of frauds, id. § 110; or 3) contracts which have unconscionable terms, id. § 208.
121. See infra notes 128-139 and accompanying text.
122. Courts should recognize that factors such as adequate capitalization, while
relevant in the typical alter ego case, are irrelevant when the limited liability rule is
not challenged. For example, in Kahili, Inc. v. Yamamoto, 54 Hawaii 267, 506 P.2d 9
(1973), the court's discussion of Kahili's capitalization was totally unnecessary in deciding whether to allow the contract defense. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
125. This occurs because creditors usually require personal guarantees before
making the loan. See Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 P. 723 (1924);
Perkins v. Trinity Realty Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 723, 61 A. 167 (N.J. Ch. 1905), af'd, 71 N.J.
Eq. 304, 71 A. 1135 (N.J. 1906). In neither of these cases did the courts specifically
refer to the financial unit of sole shareholder and corporation. Apparently, that was
not important.

2ALTERNATIVE CHALLENGES

1982]

parent and subsidiary corporations where the parent corporation
must indemnify the subsidiary,1 26 it would be more convenient to
allow the setoff and settle the disputes in one lawsuit. It would
also be less costly to settle all disputes in one lawsuit. Thus, another important policy, judicial economy, would be served. In
these cases, diversification of risk is not at issue because the entire
risk is already borne by one person in the sole shareholder case
and by one business in the parent/subsidiary case. Thus, the effects of disregarding corporate separateness will not influence a
potential investor's desire to invest. In sum, disregarding the corporate entity in these cases serves to further the policies of convenience and judicial economy without frustrating other important
economic policies.
2.

Conduits Through Which Other Defenses May Be
Interposed

In cases like Kahili, Inc. v. Yamamoto,127 where the shareholders use the separate entity fiction to shield themselves from
responsibility for their acts, courts should disregard the corporate
entity. In those cases, the shareholders do not use the separate
entity concept to diversify risk or as a convenient method by
which to transact business. In addition, the contract law policy at
issue 2 8 is very strong. Since no economic policies are compromised and an important contract policy is at stake in these
cases, 129 courts should disregard the corporate entity. If the shareholders in Kahii were regarded as separate from and independent
of the corporation (the buyer), the sellers would have been deprived of a legitimate contract defense.
3. Expectations of the Parties Cases
In cases like FontainbleauHotel Corp. v. Crossman, 30 where
126. This occurs because of contractual guarantees. See authorities cited supra
note 84. See also, e.g., Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 F. 827 (4th Cir. 1914)
(the subsidiary was required to pay its parent a management fee which equalled the
former's net earnings). But see Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127
N.E. 2d 832 (1955) (parent corporation not held liable on contract debts of bankrupt
subsidiary even though subsidiary was not permitted to earn a profit during its normal operations prior to bankruptcy).
127. 54 Hawaii 267, 506 P.2d 9 (1973). See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying
text.
128. The policy issue is whether one can use the defense of the other party's prevention of the occurrence of a condition as an excuse for non-performance. See S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 677 (3d ed. 1961) ("It is a
principle of fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of the failure
of performance

. . .

he cannot take advantage of the failure.").

129. See id.
130. 273 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1959), at'd,286 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1961). See supra
text accompanying notes 98-102.
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shareholders seek to disregard the corporate entity for their own
benefit, the analysis should proceed as follows. First, the court
should determine which aspect of the separate entity is being challenged. If this analysis had been applied in Crossman, the court
would have found that the defendant was seeking to disregard the
fiction of the separate corporate entity in order to avoid eviction.13 Second, the court should examine the policies involved in
the case. In Crossman, the court would have found that the diversification of risk policy was not affected because the transaction
did not place any shareholders at risk. The convenience policy
would have been frustrated, however, if the separate entity were
recognized. This would occur because the separate corporate
form hinders the smooth operation of business by allowing a party
to defeat contractual expectations for its own benefit. The contract policy of fulfilling the expectations of the parties and must be
weighted heavily. 32 In cases like Crossman, then, the corporate
entity should be disregarded because the policies favoring recog133
nition of the entity are not affected.
4.

Usury Cases

In the typical usury case, a debtor challenges the separate entity concept to plead the defense of usury. In these cases, the
lender has tried to avoid complying with legislative intent to exempt individual borrowers from extremely high interest rates by
requiring a prospective borrower to incorporate. The lender then
makes the loan to the newly formed "corporation" at a usurious
34
rate of interest.1
If a court were to disregard the corporate entity in these cases,
none of the policies supporting the separate entity concept would
be adversely affected. Here, the corporation is no different from a
sole proprietorship. As no corporate investment occurred, diversification of risk is not a policy consideration in these cases. Convenience is not affected because the corporation was not
131. See id. In Crossman, the landlord sued the tenant for violating a provision of
her lease by assigning it to her solely-owned corporation. That transaction involved
no fraud or misrepresentation. The same parties would reside on the premises and,
because an assignment ordinarily does not relieve the assignor of its duties, the pool
of money from which the landlord could collect the rent would be the same.
132. See generally E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS 534-65 (3d ed. 1980), for a discussion of enforcement of a party's expectations as a theory of contract law.
133. See also Epstein v. Fabrikraft Corp., 67 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1947) (court found no
substantial violation of lease where tenant corporation subleased portion of premises
to corporation; same person owned stock of both lessee and sublessee, was president
of both corporations; and sublease did not cause any detriment, loss, or injury to
landlord).
134. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
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functioning freely in the free enterprise system. In fact, the borrower was coerced into becoming a corporate entity.
Arguably, the lender acted in bad faith by attempting to circumvent the usury laws' protection of individual borrowers. This
behavior should be taken into account. The courts that have disregarded the separate entity have looked to the strong legislative
policy against usury. 35 Those courts that have recognized the entity have failed to note such a policy. They reason that the usury
laws have not been evaded, but instead have been followed in order to accomplish what the laws do not forbid. 136 Such an argument, though technically correct, fails to consider that the statute
was enacted to prevent lenders from charging usurious rates to
individual borrowers. 137 Thus, the legislative intent is circumvented by lenders who require borrowers to incorporate.
Another policy for courts to consider is that of fulfilling the
expectations of contracting parties. The shareholders generally
enter into the transaction with their eyes open, knowing the significance of incorporation. 38 Thus, the expectations of the contracting parties would be fulfilled by the courts' recognizing the
corporate entity. Frequently, however, courts are unwilling to uphold the expectations of parties when those expectations do not
comport with legislative policy. 39 In these cases, courts usually
decide that the policies against enforcing such agreements outweigh the policy of fulfilling the parties' expectations. 40 Since
none of the strong policies for retaining the separate form are affected, and the parties' expectations violate a strong legislative
policy against usury, the separate entity should be disregarded.
5. Tax Advantages
The tax cases present a complicated problem. The facts usually disclose that taxpayers are trying to reduce their tax liability
by characterizing themselves as corporations.' 4 1 The Internal
Revenue Service seeks to maximize the parties' taxes either by
taxing the entities separately or by separating non-deductible personal expenses from deductible corporate expenses.' 42 This di135. See supra note 106.
136. See supra note 107.
137. Cf. note 103 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 107.
139. See supra note 106.
140. See supra note 106.
141. See supra notes I 11-113 and accompanying text.
142. In various places, the tax code neatly handles this characterization problem
with a mechanical test. For example, I.R.C. § 1239(a) (Supp. IV 1980) states that gain
between "related persons" will be recognized as ordinary income. "Related persons"
are defined as either an individual or a corporation, 80% of which is owned directly or
indirectly by or for such individual, id. § 1239(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980), or two or more
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chotomy of purpose is an example of the tension between a caseby-case analysis and a hard and fast rule. A rigid rule would reduce the cost of litigation to determine the status of the entities,
but would ignore distinctions between different forms of business
entities. 143
Furthermore, the loopholes and counterlegislations written
into the law make it difficult to identify tax policies. As a result, it
is not clear which policies would be affected by ignoring the general rule of separate taxation.'" Also, the tax code is not ideal
because 1 it penalizes the most efficient corporations most
heavily. 45"'
Of all the reasons for recognizing the separate entity, the convenience policy is the only one clearly jeopardized when the separate entity is disregarded. Separate taxation is convenient because
computation is easy. Since the other policies underlying the tax
code are vague and the convenience policy would be served, the
balance seems to weigh in favor of consistently recognizing the
corporate form. This would occur at the behest of either the individual taxpayer or the Internal Revenue Service.
CONCLUSION

Courts faced with alternative challenges to the fiction of the
separate entity have used traditional alter ego analysis. The traditional alter ego analysis, however, is not appropriate in these
cases. The courts merely repeat a broad metaphoric rule and then
mechanically evaluate a list of factors. In addition, the courts
have failed to articulate the basic policies underlying each individual challenge and often consider irrelevant factors in their inquiry.
This Comment has proposed a mode of analysis which provides a framework for solving the problem of alternative chalcorporations, 80% or more in value of the stock of each of which is owned directly or
indirectly by or for the same individual, id. § 1239(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
143. See E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 60-66
(1976), for a discussion of the courts' and Congress' struggle with whether a hard and
fast rule or a flexible one would handle the problem of judicial review of tax issues
most effectively.
144. See generally W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX

370-400 (1976); Stein, "hat's Wrong with the Federal Tax System?, in HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM
107 (Comm. Print 1959). As Professor Klein demonstrates, the legislative intent behind the tax statutes is vague. The code does, however, expressly impose a double tax
on the corporate structure. See I.R.C. §§ 116, 316 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ, supra note 143, at 974--75.
145. Cf. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 39, 1.02-.03 (individual income
tax rates are much greater than corporate rates; thus, the income tax falls most heavily
on those corporations that are able to pay out the most dividends to their
shareholders).
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lenges to the corporate form. This mode of analysis considers the
economic policies underlying the separate entities concept and the
social policies underlying each alternative challenge. Society considers some social policies important enough to outweigh various
economic policies. Thus, both categories of policies must be balanced when a court considers whether to disregard the corporate
entity.
The proposed mode of analysis requires the court to evaluate
the facts and to determine which aspect of the separate entity concept is challenged. It then requires identification of all relevant
policies which either would be furthered or frustrated by disregarding the separateness of the corporate entity. Finally, the court
must balance all relevant economic and non-economic policies.
This analysis forces courts to articulate the rationale for their decisions and should help courts develop a cogent body of law for
alternative challenges to the corporate fiction.
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